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This chapter presents a study on fault detection mechanisms involved in secure devices in 
order to prevent faults-based attacks. We explore the solutions based on the use of error 
detection codes (parity bits, CRC) and we discuss the strengths and the weaknesses of these 
solutions with regards to error and fault detection. 
 
1. Introduction   
 
Today’s secure devices are mainly used for storage and processing of confidential data. 
Current products provide hardware and software secure solutions for civil and online 
identification, telecommunication, healthcare, banking, pay-TV, access control for restricted 
systems or areas, e-government... Tomorrow, they will include decision making capabilities
for machine to machine applications. 20 billion of secure devices are forecasted in 2020 (4 
billion in 2007) [Eurosmart, 2007].
Due to their applications, secure devices must be designed so that they can guarantee high 
levels of dependability and quality. But in addition to usual dependability features 
(reliability, availability, safety, robustness to environmental conditions), we also expect that 
they have the ability to protect information against unauthorized access and intentional 
misuse. The digital security mechanisms involved in such devices rely on various principles: 
secrecy of design and implementation, ciphering operations for encryption/decryption of 
confidential data, and hardware and software countermeasures for attack detection or 
tolerance. 
Encryption is the process of transforming data in order to make it unreadable to anyone 
except those possessing the decryption key. Encryption can be symmetric or asymmetric. In 
symmetric encryption, a sender and a recipient share the same secret key, which is used for 
both encryption of plaintexts and decryptions of corresponding cipher texts.  Conversely, 
the asymmetric algorithms use different keys for encryption and decryption. A sender S 
communicate his/her public key to all recipients R; messages encrypted with that public key 
by any R can only be decrypted by the sender S using his/her corresponding private key. 
The symmetric and asymmetric algorithms are generally public, while the secret and private 
keys are kept secret. Symmetric encryption is fast but senders and recipients need to define 
a “secure” key exchange process prior to start communication. Asymmetric encryption can 
be used for exchanging this secret key at the beginning of a communication, and then a 
symmetric-key algorithm using that secret key can be used for fast encryption during the 
remainder of the communication. The section 2 details the Advanced Encryption Standard 
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(AES), a symmetric encryption process based on the Rijndael algorithm from Joan Daemen 
and Vincent Rijmen. 
Due to their applications, secure devices are subject to attacks aiming to gather private 
information. Discovering the secret key of a symmetric cipher for instance allows decrypting 
the text encrypted with that key. Numerous types of attack rely on the hardware 
implementation of the cipher since cryptanalysis on recent algorithms is hopefully not 
practical. Most recent invasive attacks using probes or modifications of the chip are 
powerful but destroy the package, require time of specialists in laboratories and a proper 
budget. Non-invasive side-channel attacks use leakage information related to the processed 
data such as the operational timing, the power consumption of the chip, or the 
electromagnetic interferences of signals. Active but semi or non-invasive fault-based attacks 
rely on perturbation of the circuit behavior and use (expected) production of erroneous 
results for inferring secret information. Section 3 gives an overview of implementation 
techniques and data analysis performed on the reference encryption standard AES for fault-
based attacks.
Cipher algorithms are often integrated as coprocessors for better performance. As any other 
function implemented in hardware, these coprocessors need to be carefully tested in order 
to determine whether they are capable of performing the intended functions. So, test 
contributes to the dependability and the quality of the devices in the sense that it prevents 
insertion of failing hardware in dependable devices, and allows revealing faulty behaviours 
during the chip lifetime. Classically, targeted fault-set includes permanent (or intermittent) 
faults, which model physical defects due to manufacturing defaults or aging, and “natural” 
transient faults due to the environment (particle hit) (Reed et al.., 2003). However, test can 
also contribute to digital security by preventing maliciously injected transient faults to 
contribute in revealing confidential data.  While the detection of permanent faults is 
generally performed during the execution of specific test modes after production or during 
maintenance times, transient fault detection must be concurrent to the mission mode of the 
circuit. Online test solutions are thus implemented in secure chips as part of protection 
mechanisms targeting fault-attacks. In this context, fault-set includes transient stuck-at 
faults on gate signals in the combination part of the cipher, and bit-flips on memory 
elements (Leveugle, 2007). In this context, potential faults are generally detected through 
identification of erroneous signal(s) on a function or sub-function output.  Section 4 presents 
the solutions from the literature for error-detection schemes in AES ciphers. These solutions 
are first compared using common evaluation criteria such as implementation cost and fault 
detection latency. 
These solutions are then compared in terms of error detection capacity in Section 5. 
Experimental data shows the percentage of undetected errors for each scheme according to 
the number of erroneous bits injected in one or several bytes during execution of the AES 
encryption. 
Finally, the quality of the protection mechanisms is also evaluated in terms of capacity to 
detect most frequent misbehavior. Section 6 presents an analysis on the diffusion of errors in 
the responses of the AES cipher in the case of single transient stuck-at faults and discuss the 
choice of appropriate detection mechanisms. 
 
 
 
2. Advanced Encryption Standard 
 
Even if fault detection techniques described in this chapter are general enough to be 
implemented for secure devices implementing any cryptographic algorithm, we use the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as support example. This section details the AES 
which was adopted by the US government (FIPS-197, 2001). 
The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt (encipher) and decrypt 
(decipher) information. Encryption converts data to an unintelligible form called cipher text; 
decrypting the cipher text converts the data back into its original form, called plaintext. 
Encryption and decryption are performed by means of the same cryptographic secret key. 
The AES algorithm is capable of using cryptographic keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits to 
encrypt and decrypt data in blocks of 128 bits. This section focuses on the encryption 
algorithm for 128-bits cryptographic keys (details on decryption and others key lengths are 
fully described in (FIPS-197, 2001)). 
The basic unit for processing in the AES algorithm is a byte. Input, output and secret key bit 
sequences are internally processed on a two-dimensional array of bytes called the State. The 
State consists of four rows of four bytes. In the State array, denoted by the symbol s, each 
individual byte has two indices, with its row number r in the range 0 ≤ r < 3 and its column 
number c in the range 0 ≤ c ≤ 3.  
 
in0 in4 in8 in12
in1 in5 in9 in13
in2 in6 in10 in14
in3 in7 in11 in15
s0,0 s0,1 s0,2 s0,3
s1,0 s1,1 s1,2 s1,3
s2,0 s2,1 s2,2 s2,3
s3,0 s3,1 s3,2 s3,3
out0 out4 out8 out12
out1 out5 out9 out13
out2 out6 out10 out14
out3 out7 out11 out15
Fig. 1. Input, State and Output arrays
 
The AES algorithm is based on permutations and substitutions. Permutations are 
rearrangements of data, while substitutions replace one unit of data with another. AES 
performs permutations and substitutions using several different functions. 
At the beginning of the encryption, the input is copied to the State array using the 
conventions described in Fig. 1. After an initial XOR operation between the State array and 
the cipher key, the State array is transformed by implementing a round function that is 
repeated 10 times (see Section 2.1), with the final round differing slightly from the first 9 
rounds. The final State is then copied to the output as shown in Fig. 1. 
The round function is parameterized using a Key Expansion function that generates a 
variation of the original cipher key at each round repetition (see Section 2.2). 
Fig. 2 summarizes the AES algorithm. 
 
2.1 Round 
Round function is composed of 4 operations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
AddRoundKey. These functions operate and modify the value of the State. As shown in Fig. 
www.intechopen.com
Fault Detection in Crypto-Devices 179
(AES), a symmetric encryption process based on the Rijndael algorithm from Joan Daemen 
and Vincent Rijmen. 
Due to their applications, secure devices are subject to attacks aiming to gather private 
information. Discovering the secret key of a symmetric cipher for instance allows decrypting 
the text encrypted with that key. Numerous types of attack rely on the hardware 
implementation of the cipher since cryptanalysis on recent algorithms is hopefully not 
practical. Most recent invasive attacks using probes or modifications of the chip are 
powerful but destroy the package, require time of specialists in laboratories and a proper 
budget. Non-invasive side-channel attacks use leakage information related to the processed 
data such as the operational timing, the power consumption of the chip, or the 
electromagnetic interferences of signals. Active but semi or non-invasive fault-based attacks 
rely on perturbation of the circuit behavior and use (expected) production of erroneous 
results for inferring secret information. Section 3 gives an overview of implementation 
techniques and data analysis performed on the reference encryption standard AES for fault-
based attacks.
Cipher algorithms are often integrated as coprocessors for better performance. As any other 
function implemented in hardware, these coprocessors need to be carefully tested in order 
to determine whether they are capable of performing the intended functions. So, test 
contributes to the dependability and the quality of the devices in the sense that it prevents 
insertion of failing hardware in dependable devices, and allows revealing faulty behaviours 
during the chip lifetime. Classically, targeted fault-set includes permanent (or intermittent) 
faults, which model physical defects due to manufacturing defaults or aging, and “natural” 
transient faults due to the environment (particle hit) (Reed et al.., 2003). However, test can 
also contribute to digital security by preventing maliciously injected transient faults to 
contribute in revealing confidential data.  While the detection of permanent faults is 
generally performed during the execution of specific test modes after production or during 
maintenance times, transient fault detection must be concurrent to the mission mode of the 
circuit. Online test solutions are thus implemented in secure chips as part of protection 
mechanisms targeting fault-attacks. In this context, fault-set includes transient stuck-at 
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elements (Leveugle, 2007). In this context, potential faults are generally detected through 
identification of erroneous signal(s) on a function or sub-function output.  Section 4 presents 
the solutions from the literature for error-detection schemes in AES ciphers. These solutions 
are first compared using common evaluation criteria such as implementation cost and fault 
detection latency. 
These solutions are then compared in terms of error detection capacity in Section 5. 
Experimental data shows the percentage of undetected errors for each scheme according to 
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Finally, the quality of the protection mechanisms is also evaluated in terms of capacity to 
detect most frequent misbehavior. Section 6 presents an analysis on the diffusion of errors in 
the responses of the AES cipher in the case of single transient stuck-at faults and discuss the 
choice of appropriate detection mechanisms. 
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rearrangements of data, while substitutions replace one unit of data with another. AES 
performs permutations and substitutions using several different functions. 
At the beginning of the encryption, the input is copied to the State array using the 
conventions described in Fig. 1. After an initial XOR operation between the State array and 
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2.1 Round 
Round function is composed of 4 operations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
AddRoundKey. These functions operate and modify the value of the State. As shown in Fig. 
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2, all rounds are identical with the exception of the final round, which does not include the 
MixColumns transformation. 
 
Plaintext (128 bits)
Ciphertext (128 bits)
Cypher Key (128 bits)
for i=1 to 10
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
RoundKey (i)  (128 bits)
i<10 No
Round
 
Fig. 2. AES Algorithm 
 
A schematic view of the Round function is shown in Fig. 3. Next paragraphs describe in 
detail each of the 4 operations. 
 
 
Fig. 3. AES Round 
 
The SubBytes transformation is a non-linear byte substitution that operates independently 
on each byte of the State using a substitution table (S-box). The S-box is it is constructed by 
composing two transformations: 
1. The multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF(28), where the element (00000000)2 is 
mapped to itself; 
 
2. The following affine transformation (over GF(2)): 
iiiiiii cbbbbbb   8mod)7(8mod)6(8mod)5(8mod)4('  
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7, where bi is the ith bit of the byte, and ci is the ith bit of a byte c whose 
value is fixed by the standard and it is equal to {01100011}.  
The S-box can be seen as a look-up table where for each 8-bits input there is a unique 8-bits 
output value. Several hardware implementations have been proposed in the literature. They 
can be classified in three major categories: 
1. ROM-based (Zhang and Parhi, 2002); 
2. Look-up table implementation (combinational logic): the S-box is written in any 
hardware description language as a look-up table and it is converted into a gate-level 
circuit using a logic synthesizer (Di Natale et al., 2007 A). This solution allows the 
best performances in terms of speed and dynamic power consumption; 
3. Mathematical implementation: instead of describing the S-box as look-up table, the 
circuit is described as the sequence of operations in the finite field GF and then 
synthesized. This alternative can provide better solutions in terms of area occupation 
and leakage power consumption (Wolkerstorferm et al., 2002).  
In order to provide an idea of the differences between look-up table based implementations 
and mathematical implementations, we implemented in VHDL the solutions proposed in 
(Di Natale et al., 2007 A) (look-up table) and in (Wolkerstorferm et al., 2002) (mathematical) 
and then we synthesized the two circuits. Table 1 shows the comparison of area, speed and 
power consumptions obtained using a 90nm technology library provided by ST 
Microelectronics, where a new input is provided to the circuit every 3 ns. 
 
 Look-up table implementation Mathematical implementation 
Area [µm2] 1993 1122 
Delay of critical path [ns] 1.25 (14 logic levels) 2.45 (25 logic levels) 
Average Dynamic Power [mW] 0.136 0.907 
Table. 1. Comparison of area, delay and power between look-up table implementation and 
Mathematical implementation (ASIC) 
 
The ShiftRows operation changes the byte position in the State. It rotates each row with 
different offsets to obtain a new State as follows: ����� � � ����������   
���������    
���������    
����������� The first row is unchanged; the second row is rotated one byte position to the left, the third 
row two byte positions, and the fourth row three byte positions. ShiftRows is a linear 
transformation. Hardware implementation of this transformation resumes to wiring. 
 
The MixColumns operates column-wise altering all the bytes of the same column. It treats a 
column as a 3rd degree polynomial with coefficients in GF (28) and produces the new 
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column by multiplying it with a constant polynomial. This operation is performed modulo a 
4th degree polynomial with coefficients in GF (28). 
Let si,si+1,si+2,and si+3 be four consecutive bytes (column-wise),  iЄ{0,4,8,12} in the State 
matrix before MixColumns. These four bytes are transformed as: � ��������������� � �
�2 �����3
 �3  �2����
��  �3�2��
�����3�2� �
��������������� where the ti's are the State bytes after the MixColumns operation. The MixColumns 
operation is typically implemented as XOR-trees.  
The AddRoundKey adds the corresponding round key to the current State. In the GF(28) 
field, addition is implemented as a bit-wise XOR operation between the two elements. The 
implementation of the AddRounkey operation resumes to a single layer of XOR gates. 
 
2.2 Key Expansion 
The AES algorithm takes the Cipher Key and performs a Key Expansion routine to generate 
a key schedule. The Key Expansion generates a total of 11 words (the initial key plus one 
roundkey for each of the ten rounds).  Each generated key has 128 bits that are organized in 
a state array as defined for the data in Figure 1 (i.e., the jth byte of the key state word is 
composed of the bits from 8j to 8j+7). 
We define Ki the key of ith round (0  i  10), where K0 denotes the initial secret key. The 
generation of a new round key depends on the previous one. Fig. 4 shows the scheme of 
generation on a new key Ki+1 starting from Ki. The transformation Fi is a non-linear function 
composed of 4 S-boxes (one for each byte), a rotation of bytes, and the addition of a round 
specific constant, defined by the standard. More details about the generation process are 
given in (FIPS-197, 2001).  
 
0 32 64 9631 63 95 127
0 32 64 9631 63 95 127
Ki
Ki+1
Fi
 
Fig. 4. AES Key Expansion Scheme 
 
3. Fault attacks 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, faults can be either permanent (due to fabrication defects) 
or transient (due to environmental conditions such as the exposure to cosmic radiations). 
For the particular case of crypto-coprocessors, transient faults can also be maliciously and 
intentionally injected in the circuit in order to retrieve the secret key (Blömer and Seifert, 
2003). By comparing the result of a normal encryption with a faulty one, a hacker can 
deduce the key. These techniques are referred to as "Differential Fault Analysis" (DFA). 
Faults can be injected by different means such as temperature variation, clock frequency 
modification, exposure to radiations UV, X or visible light (Kim and Quisquater, 2007). The 
formers are quite efficient for software implementations of the crypto algorithm, while the 
latter (i.e., laser-based fault injection) is particularly well-suited for hardware 
implementations. The main advantage of laser-based fault injection is the localization of the 
fault (in the timing and the spatial domains). 
In this context, it is thus of prime importance to be able to detect such faults. Nevertheless, 
independently of the mean used to inject the fault, the induced error must satisfy certain 
conditions in order to be successfully exploited. The following subsections quickly review 
the published DFA attacks on AES and analyze these conditions on the injected errors. 
 
3.1 Attacks on 1 bit 
One of the first cryptanalysis method using faults on AES has been published by (Giraud, 
2005). The considered error is a single faulty bit  on any of the 128 State bits at the input of 
the SubBytes operation during execution of the last encryption round (10th round). This  
error of multiplicity one (only one bit is affected)is equivalent to an error of multiplicity one  
appearing on the round key or on the input of the previous AddRoundKey operation. This 
error spreads, affects the output of the SubBytes operation and, since the last round does not 
include the Mixcolum operation, it also affects one (and only one) byte of the final Output 
array. The attack can be summarized as follows: let denote B9 one of the output bytes of the 
last but one round (i.e., the one where the fault will be injected), e the 8-bit error mask (it 
contains only one asserted bit in the position where the error is considered), and BK10 the 
byte of the round key K10 at the same position of B9 (among the 16 bytes). The correct output 
result should be {SubBytes(B9)BK10}. Because of the fault, the result is 
{SubBytes(B9e)BK10}. By adding these two results, it comes:  
d = {SubBytes(B9)BK10}{SubBytes(B9e)BK10} = SubBytes(B9)SubBytes(B9e) 
There are 8 possibilities for the faulty bit. For each possibility, the list of possible B9 values is 
built up. The same process is iterated with other values of e. In average, the value of B9 can 
be obtained with 3 faults. Then, by adding SubBytes(B9) to the correct result, the byte BK10 of 
the key is obtained. In about 50 fault injections, the whole round key K10 can be fully 
determined. The primary key K0 can be mathematically derived from K10. 
 
In (Blömer and Seifert, 2003) the authors proposed attacks based on the “safe error” 
principle, i.e. "the error affects the result or not". The considered fault is a stuck-at-0 
affecting one bit of the key. If the result is faulty, the actual value of the key bit is 1.  
 
In (Blömer and Krummel, 2006) the authors report another attack based on the injection of 
an error of multiplicity one which exploits collision effects, i.e. the fact that a two messages 
(one without, the other one with an error) will give the same result.  
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conditions in order to be successfully exploited. The following subsections quickly review 
the published DFA attacks on AES and analyze these conditions on the injected errors. 
 
3.1 Attacks on 1 bit 
One of the first cryptanalysis method using faults on AES has been published by (Giraud, 
2005). The considered error is a single faulty bit  on any of the 128 State bits at the input of 
the SubBytes operation during execution of the last encryption round (10th round). This  
error of multiplicity one (only one bit is affected)is equivalent to an error of multiplicity one  
appearing on the round key or on the input of the previous AddRoundKey operation. This 
error spreads, affects the output of the SubBytes operation and, since the last round does not 
include the Mixcolum operation, it also affects one (and only one) byte of the final Output 
array. The attack can be summarized as follows: let denote B9 one of the output bytes of the 
last but one round (i.e., the one where the fault will be injected), e the 8-bit error mask (it 
contains only one asserted bit in the position where the error is considered), and BK10 the 
byte of the round key K10 at the same position of B9 (among the 16 bytes). The correct output 
result should be {SubBytes(B9)BK10}. Because of the fault, the result is 
{SubBytes(B9e)BK10}. By adding these two results, it comes:  
d = {SubBytes(B9)BK10}{SubBytes(B9e)BK10} = SubBytes(B9)SubBytes(B9e) 
There are 8 possibilities for the faulty bit. For each possibility, the list of possible B9 values is 
built up. The same process is iterated with other values of e. In average, the value of B9 can 
be obtained with 3 faults. Then, by adding SubBytes(B9) to the correct result, the byte BK10 of 
the key is obtained. In about 50 fault injections, the whole round key K10 can be fully 
determined. The primary key K0 can be mathematically derived from K10. 
 
In (Blömer and Seifert, 2003) the authors proposed attacks based on the “safe error” 
principle, i.e. "the error affects the result or not". The considered fault is a stuck-at-0 
affecting one bit of the key. If the result is faulty, the actual value of the key bit is 1.  
 
In (Blömer and Krummel, 2006) the authors report another attack based on the injection of 
an error of multiplicity one which exploits collision effects, i.e. the fact that a two messages 
(one without, the other one with an error) will give the same result.  
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3.2 Attacks on 1 byte 
In (Giraud, 2005), Giraud also proposes a more complex attack with the advantage of 
considering a less restrictive error model than errors on a single bit only. Here, errors of 
multiplicity x (x ≥1) affecting one byte are taken into account. The attack is composed of 
three steps: 
1. an error is injected on the round key K9 just before the last KeySchedule. This error 
affects 5 bytes of the next key K10, four of them being on the same line of the Key State 
array. Using the same set of equations than in the previously mentioned attack, one byte 
of the last column of the last round key is obtained. By repeating this step 4 times, the 4 
bytes of the last column of K9 are retrieved. 
2. an error is injected on the last column of K8 before the penultimate KeySchedule. This 
spreads on 10 bytes. One of these faulty bytes gives information on the propagated error 
during the last KeySchedule. Since, the last column of K9 is known, 3 bytes of K8 can be 
definitely determined and it remains 130 possibilities of its fourth byte. This gives the 
penultimate column of K9.  
3. in the last step, an error is injected on the last column of the State array before round 10. 
Thus, all values which satisfy the observed differences on the output are determined 
using an exhaustive search on the 242 possibilities. Since, the last column before round 
10 is known and also the two last columns of K9, one can derive 14 bytes of K10. The two 
last ones are determined using an exhaustive search. 
Some other attacks relying on several fault injections on bytes are reported in (Chen and 
Yen, 2003), (Piret and Quisquater, 2003), and (Dusart et al., 2003). 
 
The attack in (Blömer and Seifert, 2003), based on the "safe error" principle, can be extended 
to the case of attack on 1 byte. In this case all the input bits of an S-box must be stuck at 0. 
Then, by applying all 256 values at the input of the S-box, a collision appears: when the byte 
has the same value as the key, the result equals the one obtained with the stuck-at fault.  
 
3.3 Attacks on several bytes on the same column  
In (Moraidi et al., 2006) the authors propose a generalization of the attack on a single byte, 
focusing on 3 or 4 bytes in the first State array column. The faults can be injected at any step 
of the AES process. For the attack to be successful, it is necessary to know if the error affects 
3 or 4 bytes. Furthermore, 6 and 1500 error injections have to be performed for 3 and 4 faulty 
bytes respectively.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we do not discuss about the actual capabilities of injecting faults according to 
the hypothesis underlying those attacks. Nevertheless, from this overview, it can be 
concluded that: 
 To our knowledge, errors affecting more than one byte (except (Moraidi et al., 2006)) 
cannot be exploited to perform an attack. Thus it's of prime importance to detect errors 
located within a byte. All error multiplicities (1 to 8) have to be considered.  
 According to the variety of reported attacks, all time steps (rounds) of the AES algorithm 
are prone to fault injections. Thus, the data protection mechanism must span over the 
whole AES process. 
 While errors affecting more than one byte are not exploitable by nowadays reported 
attacks, their detection is of interest since, firstly it helps in detecting an attack (for 
instance laser-based attacks need in practice many shots before succeeding in flipping 
bits within a single byte), and secondly the ingenuity of hackers may make efficient these 
attacks in the future. 
 
4. Error Detection Methods 
 
Concurrent fault detection for hardware implementations of secure devices is important not 
only to protect the system from random faults, but also to protect it the from an attacker 
who may maliciously inject faults in order to find the encryption secret key. 
Several error detection solutions have been proposed in the literature, they rely on the use of 
some form of spatial or temporal redundancy. (Karri et al., 2002) propose a solution suitable 
for systems containing both encryption and decryption modules. The basic idea is to use the 
decryption module to decrypt the encrypted data (ciphertext), and to verify that the 
ciphertext is equal to the actual plaintext. (Maistri et al., 2007) propose a design solution that 
exploits temporal redundancy by a Double-Data-Rate mechanism in order to perform the 
computation twice without affecting adversely the overall throughput of the system. 
(Monnet et al., 2006) propose quasi-delay insensitive (QDI) asynchronous logic design to 
cope with fault attacks. Indeed, specific properties of asynchronous circuits make them 
inherently resistant against a large class of faults.  Finally, several papers have been 
published on the use of codes to detect faults in secure devices. In particular, we focus the 
analysis on the architectures proposed in (Wu et al., 2004), (Bertoni et al., 2003), (Yen and 
Wu, 2006), and (Di Natale et al., 2007 B), as representative of the wide range of code-based 
solutions. 
In a code-based fault detection scheme for a block of logic gates, the basic approach is that 
the output code of the block is predicted from the input data and this code is compared to 
the actual code calculated from the block output data of the block. The disadvantage of this 
technique is the use of the data bits to predict the code since corrupted bits may affect the 
code and the error may not be detected. 
 (Wu et al., 2004) propose the use of a parity bit for each of the 16 S-boxes that are XOR-
merged in a single parity bit for the whole 128-bits data block. The single parity bit is used to 
check the correctness of the other blocks of the round. The datapath implementing the AES 
round with concurrent checking is shown in Fig. 5.  
The principle is to compare the input parity of a round with the predicted output parity of 
the previous round, at each round. For that, the parity of the input values of a round is first 
determined (P(x) in the figure). Then, the parity bit is modified according to the operations 
executed during the round. In particular, a parity bit of the word composed by the input (xi) 
and the output (yi) is predicted for each S-box. The 16 parity bits so calculated are then 
added to obtain a single parity bit (P(x)P(y)). This parity bit is added again to the input 
parity bit P(x) so that the parity P(y) is determined. P(y) is not affected by neither ShiftRows, 
which only changes the byte position in the state array, nor MixColumns operations (Wu et 
al., 2004). This parity bit is then modified by adding the parity of the key P(k) and stored in a 
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3.2 Attacks on 1 byte 
In (Giraud, 2005), Giraud also proposes a more complex attack with the advantage of 
considering a less restrictive error model than errors on a single bit only. Here, errors of 
multiplicity x (x ≥1) affecting one byte are taken into account. The attack is composed of 
three steps: 
1. an error is injected on the round key K9 just before the last KeySchedule. This error 
affects 5 bytes of the next key K10, four of them being on the same line of the Key State 
array. Using the same set of equations than in the previously mentioned attack, one byte 
of the last column of the last round key is obtained. By repeating this step 4 times, the 4 
bytes of the last column of K9 are retrieved. 
2. an error is injected on the last column of K8 before the penultimate KeySchedule. This 
spreads on 10 bytes. One of these faulty bytes gives information on the propagated error 
during the last KeySchedule. Since, the last column of K9 is known, 3 bytes of K8 can be 
definitely determined and it remains 130 possibilities of its fourth byte. This gives the 
penultimate column of K9.  
3. in the last step, an error is injected on the last column of the State array before round 10. 
Thus, all values which satisfy the observed differences on the output are determined 
using an exhaustive search on the 242 possibilities. Since, the last column before round 
10 is known and also the two last columns of K9, one can derive 14 bytes of K10. The two 
last ones are determined using an exhaustive search. 
Some other attacks relying on several fault injections on bytes are reported in (Chen and 
Yen, 2003), (Piret and Quisquater, 2003), and (Dusart et al., 2003). 
 
The attack in (Blömer and Seifert, 2003), based on the "safe error" principle, can be extended 
to the case of attack on 1 byte. In this case all the input bits of an S-box must be stuck at 0. 
Then, by applying all 256 values at the input of the S-box, a collision appears: when the byte 
has the same value as the key, the result equals the one obtained with the stuck-at fault.  
 
3.3 Attacks on several bytes on the same column  
In (Moraidi et al., 2006) the authors propose a generalization of the attack on a single byte, 
focusing on 3 or 4 bytes in the first State array column. The faults can be injected at any step 
of the AES process. For the attack to be successful, it is necessary to know if the error affects 
3 or 4 bytes. Furthermore, 6 and 1500 error injections have to be performed for 3 and 4 faulty 
bytes respectively.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we do not discuss about the actual capabilities of injecting faults according to 
the hypothesis underlying those attacks. Nevertheless, from this overview, it can be 
concluded that: 
 To our knowledge, errors affecting more than one byte (except (Moraidi et al., 2006)) 
cannot be exploited to perform an attack. Thus it's of prime importance to detect errors 
located within a byte. All error multiplicities (1 to 8) have to be considered.  
 According to the variety of reported attacks, all time steps (rounds) of the AES algorithm 
are prone to fault injections. Thus, the data protection mechanism must span over the 
whole AES process. 
 While errors affecting more than one byte are not exploitable by nowadays reported 
attacks, their detection is of interest since, firstly it helps in detecting an attack (for 
instance laser-based attacks need in practice many shots before succeeding in flipping 
bits within a single byte), and secondly the ingenuity of hackers may make efficient these 
attacks in the future. 
 
4. Error Detection Methods 
 
Concurrent fault detection for hardware implementations of secure devices is important not 
only to protect the system from random faults, but also to protect it the from an attacker 
who may maliciously inject faults in order to find the encryption secret key. 
Several error detection solutions have been proposed in the literature, they rely on the use of 
some form of spatial or temporal redundancy. (Karri et al., 2002) propose a solution suitable 
for systems containing both encryption and decryption modules. The basic idea is to use the 
decryption module to decrypt the encrypted data (ciphertext), and to verify that the 
ciphertext is equal to the actual plaintext. (Maistri et al., 2007) propose a design solution that 
exploits temporal redundancy by a Double-Data-Rate mechanism in order to perform the 
computation twice without affecting adversely the overall throughput of the system. 
(Monnet et al., 2006) propose quasi-delay insensitive (QDI) asynchronous logic design to 
cope with fault attacks. Indeed, specific properties of asynchronous circuits make them 
inherently resistant against a large class of faults.  Finally, several papers have been 
published on the use of codes to detect faults in secure devices. In particular, we focus the 
analysis on the architectures proposed in (Wu et al., 2004), (Bertoni et al., 2003), (Yen and 
Wu, 2006), and (Di Natale et al., 2007 B), as representative of the wide range of code-based 
solutions. 
In a code-based fault detection scheme for a block of logic gates, the basic approach is that 
the output code of the block is predicted from the input data and this code is compared to 
the actual code calculated from the block output data of the block. The disadvantage of this 
technique is the use of the data bits to predict the code since corrupted bits may affect the 
code and the error may not be detected. 
 (Wu et al., 2004) propose the use of a parity bit for each of the 16 S-boxes that are XOR-
merged in a single parity bit for the whole 128-bits data block. The single parity bit is used to 
check the correctness of the other blocks of the round. The datapath implementing the AES 
round with concurrent checking is shown in Fig. 5.  
The principle is to compare the input parity of a round with the predicted output parity of 
the previous round, at each round. For that, the parity of the input values of a round is first 
determined (P(x) in the figure). Then, the parity bit is modified according to the operations 
executed during the round. In particular, a parity bit of the word composed by the input (xi) 
and the output (yi) is predicted for each S-box. The 16 parity bits so calculated are then 
added to obtain a single parity bit (P(x)P(y)). This parity bit is added again to the input 
parity bit P(x) so that the parity P(y) is determined. P(y) is not affected by neither ShiftRows, 
which only changes the byte position in the state array, nor MixColumns operations (Wu et 
al., 2004). This parity bit is then modified by adding the parity of the key P(k) and stored in a 
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1-bit register. Errors are detected when this predicted parity bit differs from the input parity 
computed at the beginning of the next round. 
The authors implemented this solution on a Xilinx Virtex 1000 FPGA. The hardware 
overhead is about 8% and the additional time delay is about 5%. Details about error 
detection capability are given in Section 5. It must be noted that this technique, while being 
effective when S-boxes are ROM-implemented, is quite costly for standard gates 
implementations.  
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 Fig. 5. (Wu et al., 2004) concurrent checking scheme 
 
In (Bertoni et al., 2003) the authors propose to use 16 parity bits instead of a single bit. In 
particular, a parity bit is associated to each byte of the state (see Fig. 6).  
Concerning the S-boxes, the authors propose a ROM-based implementation. The extra 
parity bit is stores in that ROM resulting in a 256x9 bits memory. Moreover, to detect input 
parity errors and some internal memory (data or decode) errors, authors propose the use of 
a 512×9 ROM, where the ninth bit is driven bit the input parity bit. They deliberately force 
all the ROM words corresponding to a wrong input address (i.e., S-boxes input with a 
wrong parity bit associated) with a dummy output value where the output parity is wrong, 
so that the detection mechanism will detect the fault. 
As before, the parity bit associated to each byte does not change after the ShiftRows 
operation. On the contrary, the prediction of the output parity bits of the MixColumns is the 
most mathematically complex for this type of architecture, because it depends on the value 
of 4 bytes of the state (see details in (Bertoni et al., 2003)). For AddRoundKey operation, the 
prediction of the output parity bit easily consists in adding the current parity bits with the 
parity bits of the corresponding round key. 
(Yen and Wu, 2006) propose the use of a systematic (n+1,n) Cyclic Redundancy Check 
(CRC) over GF(28) to detect errors during encryption, where n{4,8,16} is the number of 
bytes contained in the message (see Fig. 7). The generator polynomial is g(x)=1+x. The CRC 
byte can be associated either to each column of the state (i.e., to 4 bytes and so they use 
CRC(5,4)), or to two columns (i.e., 89 bytes, so CRC(9,8)), or to the whole State (CRC(17,16)).  
This solution allows a very high error detection level at the cost of high area overhead (in 
the order of a thousand additional ports). 
 
Fig. 6. AES round with (Bertoni et al., 2003) model 
 
Since S-boxes represent the largest part of the circuit, (Di Natale et al., 2007 B) propose a 
solution that focuses on S-boxes only. They propose the use of two parity bits per S-box, one 
parity bit for the input byte of the S-box and one for its output byte. This double parity per 
S-box was also proposed in (Wu et al., 2004), but the two parity bits are now independently 
generated by dedicated prediction logics.  
 
 
Fig. 7. AES round with (Yen and Wu, 2006) model 
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1-bit register. Errors are detected when this predicted parity bit differs from the input parity 
computed at the beginning of the next round. 
The authors implemented this solution on a Xilinx Virtex 1000 FPGA. The hardware 
overhead is about 8% and the additional time delay is about 5%. Details about error 
detection capability are given in Section 5. It must be noted that this technique, while being 
effective when S-boxes are ROM-implemented, is quite costly for standard gates 
implementations.  
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In (Bertoni et al., 2003) the authors propose to use 16 parity bits instead of a single bit. In 
particular, a parity bit is associated to each byte of the state (see Fig. 6).  
Concerning the S-boxes, the authors propose a ROM-based implementation. The extra 
parity bit is stores in that ROM resulting in a 256x9 bits memory. Moreover, to detect input 
parity errors and some internal memory (data or decode) errors, authors propose the use of 
a 512×9 ROM, where the ninth bit is driven bit the input parity bit. They deliberately force 
all the ROM words corresponding to a wrong input address (i.e., S-boxes input with a 
wrong parity bit associated) with a dummy output value where the output parity is wrong, 
so that the detection mechanism will detect the fault. 
As before, the parity bit associated to each byte does not change after the ShiftRows 
operation. On the contrary, the prediction of the output parity bits of the MixColumns is the 
most mathematically complex for this type of architecture, because it depends on the value 
of 4 bytes of the state (see details in (Bertoni et al., 2003)). For AddRoundKey operation, the 
prediction of the output parity bit easily consists in adding the current parity bits with the 
parity bits of the corresponding round key. 
(Yen and Wu, 2006) propose the use of a systematic (n+1,n) Cyclic Redundancy Check 
(CRC) over GF(28) to detect errors during encryption, where n{4,8,16} is the number of 
bytes contained in the message (see Fig. 7). The generator polynomial is g(x)=1+x. The CRC 
byte can be associated either to each column of the state (i.e., to 4 bytes and so they use 
CRC(5,4)), or to two columns (i.e., 89 bytes, so CRC(9,8)), or to the whole State (CRC(17,16)).  
This solution allows a very high error detection level at the cost of high area overhead (in 
the order of a thousand additional ports). 
 
Fig. 6. AES round with (Bertoni et al., 2003) model 
 
Since S-boxes represent the largest part of the circuit, (Di Natale et al., 2007 B) propose a 
solution that focuses on S-boxes only. They propose the use of two parity bits per S-box, one 
parity bit for the input byte of the S-box and one for its output byte. This double parity per 
S-box was also proposed in (Wu et al., 2004), but the two parity bits are now independently 
generated by dedicated prediction logics.  
 
 
Fig. 7. AES round with (Yen and Wu, 2006) model 
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Then, the actual output parity is compared with the predicted output parity bit, and the 
actual input parity bit is compared to the predicted one (Fig. 8). When the S-box and the 
prediction circuits are synthesized as combinational logic, the area overhead is 38.33% with 
respect to the original S-box. This double parity checking allows additional detection of 27% 
of errors of even multiplicity compared to the solution of (Wu et al., 2004), besides all odd 
multiplicity of errors. 
 
 
Fig. 8. SubBytes transformation with (Di Natale et al., 2007 B)  model 
 
Concerning error detection flags, the predicted and actual parity bits can be compared after 
each operation, each round, or after execution of the whole encryption. These solutions are 
equivalent from the detection capability point of view. They only differ in terms of 
hardware overhead and detection latency. Multiplicity of checkpoints decreases the error 
detection latency but increases the hardware overhead. 
 
5. Error Detection 
 
The error detection schemes detailed in the preceding section are now compared in terms of 
error detection capabilities. 
Concerning the experimental setup, we assume single transient stuck-at faults, which are 
supposed to occur during the execution of one operation in one round (Fig. 9). S-boxes are 
implemented using random logic. Concerning the scheme presented in (Yen and Wu, 2006), 
we used a CRC (5,4) i.e. 4 CRC bytes, one for each column of the State array (32 bits). Since 
the error detection scheme presented in (Di Natale et al, 2007 B) only addresses errors on the 
S-boxes outputs, this protection scheme is completed with the solution proposed in (Bertoni 
et al., 2003): a faulty parity bit is affected to an S-box operation when either faulty input or 
output parities are detected. This S-box parity bit is subsequently used in the following 
prediction operations. 
We first analyzed the detection capabilities of these four techniques with respect to errors 
affecting a single byte. Errors have been exhaustively injected in every byte, every operation 
and at every round. Table 2 reports the error multiplicity (one to eight faulty bits), the 
number of simulated errors for each error multiplicity (e.g. �� � �� � �28� = 17920 error instances for 2 faulty bits among 8 bits, affecting one byte over 16 in the State array, after one 
of the 40 operations executed during the encryption), and the number of the undetected 
errors for each technique under evaluation. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Errors injection model 
 
As expected, errors with odd multiplicity are more easily detected with detection schemes 
based on parity codes (Wu et al., 2004), while the CRC-based scheme proposed in (Yen and 
Wu, 2006) outperforms other techniques by detecting even-multiplicity errors too. 
 
Output errors 
multiplicity 
# of 
possible 
errors 
 Number and percentage of the undetected errors 
(Wu et al., 2004) 
(1 parity bit) 
(Bertoni et al., 
2003) 
(16 parity bits) 
(Yen and 
Wu, 2006) 
(4 CRC 
bytes) 
(Di Natale et al., 
2007 B) 
(16 parity bits + 
S-box protection) 
1 5120 125 (2.44%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
2 17920 2644 (14.75%) 16912 (94.38%) 0 (0%) 14666 (81.84%) 
3 35840 841 (2.35%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
4 44800 6614 (14.76%) 39760 (88.75%) 0 (0%) 34095 (76.10%) 
5 35840 898 (2.51%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
6 17920 2620 (14.62%) 14896 (83.13%) 0 (0%) 12642 (70.55%) 
7 5120 110 (2.15%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
8 640 98 (15.31%) 496 (77.50%) 0 (0%) 171 (26.72%) 
Table 2. Detection capability for errors in a single byte 
 
In the next experiments we injected random errors affecting any of the 128 state bits, with 
error multiplicity ranging from 1 to 64 faulty bits. Note that if errors affecting several bytes 
are not easily exploitable during DFA, their detection is of prime interest for detecting the 
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Then, the actual output parity is compared with the predicted output parity bit, and the 
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respect to the original S-box. This double parity checking allows additional detection of 27% 
of errors of even multiplicity compared to the solution of (Wu et al., 2004), besides all odd 
multiplicity of errors. 
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equivalent from the detection capability point of view. They only differ in terms of 
hardware overhead and detection latency. Multiplicity of checkpoints decreases the error 
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implemented using random logic. Concerning the scheme presented in (Yen and Wu, 2006), 
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the error detection scheme presented in (Di Natale et al, 2007 B) only addresses errors on the 
S-boxes outputs, this protection scheme is completed with the solution proposed in (Bertoni 
et al., 2003): a faulty parity bit is affected to an S-box operation when either faulty input or 
output parities are detected. This S-box parity bit is subsequently used in the following 
prediction operations. 
We first analyzed the detection capabilities of these four techniques with respect to errors 
affecting a single byte. Errors have been exhaustively injected in every byte, every operation 
and at every round. Table 2 reports the error multiplicity (one to eight faulty bits), the 
number of simulated errors for each error multiplicity (e.g. �� � �� � �28� = 17920 error instances for 2 faulty bits among 8 bits, affecting one byte over 16 in the State array, after one 
of the 40 operations executed during the encryption), and the number of the undetected 
errors for each technique under evaluation. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Errors injection model 
 
As expected, errors with odd multiplicity are more easily detected with detection schemes 
based on parity codes (Wu et al., 2004), while the CRC-based scheme proposed in (Yen and 
Wu, 2006) outperforms other techniques by detecting even-multiplicity errors too. 
 
Output errors 
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# of 
possible 
errors 
 Number and percentage of the undetected errors 
(Wu et al., 2004) 
(1 parity bit) 
(Bertoni et al., 
2003) 
(16 parity bits) 
(Yen and 
Wu, 2006) 
(4 CRC 
bytes) 
(Di Natale et al., 
2007 B) 
(16 parity bits + 
S-box protection) 
1 5120 125 (2.44%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
2 17920 2644 (14.75%) 16912 (94.38%) 0 (0%) 14666 (81.84%) 
3 35840 841 (2.35%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
4 44800 6614 (14.76%) 39760 (88.75%) 0 (0%) 34095 (76.10%) 
5 35840 898 (2.51%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
6 17920 2620 (14.62%) 14896 (83.13%) 0 (0%) 12642 (70.55%) 
7 5120 110 (2.15%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
8 640 98 (15.31%) 496 (77.50%) 0 (0%) 171 (26.72%) 
Table 2. Detection capability for errors in a single byte 
 
In the next experiments we injected random errors affecting any of the 128 state bits, with 
error multiplicity ranging from 1 to 64 faulty bits. Note that if errors affecting several bytes 
are not easily exploitable during DFA, their detection is of prime interest for detecting the 
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attack itself. For each error multiplicity, 1000 randomly-chosen injection positions have been 
selected among randomly-chosen State array bits after execution of a randomly-chosen 
encryption operation. Simulation results are reported in Table 3. 
All the techniques detect errors with multiplicity larger than 6 bits, except the detection 
scheme in (Wu et al., 2004) that provides only one parity bit for the whole State array. 
Error  
multiplicity 
Number and percentage of the undetected errors 
 (Di Natale et al., 
2007 B) 
(16 parity bits + S-
box protection) 
(Yen and Wu, 2006)  
(4 CRC bytes) 
 (Bertoni et al., 2003) 
(16 parity bits) 
 (Wu et al., 2004) 
(1 parity bit) 
1 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 975 (2.44%) 
2 1883 (4.71%) 549 (1.37%) 2164 (5.41%) 5992 (14.98%) 
3 0 (0.00%) 2 (0.01%) 0 (0.00%) 1037 (2.59%) 
4 262 (0.66%) 70 (0.18%) 320 (0.80%) 6069 (15.17%) 
5 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 981 (2.45%) 
6 61 (0.15%) 0 (0.00%) 80 (0.20%) 6050 (15.13%) 
7 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 995 (2.49%) 
8 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5956 (14.89%) 
9 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1022 (2.56%) 
10 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5933 (14.83%) 
11 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 991 (2.48%) 
12 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6021 (15.05%) 
13 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1001 (2.50%) 
14 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6021 (15.05%) 
15 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1018 (2.55%) 
16 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5997 (14.99%) 
….   
63 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1019 (2.55%) 
64 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6008 (15.02%) 
Table 3. Detection capability for random errors in 1 to 64 bits of a State  
 
6. Faults and Error multiplicity 
 
In the previously mentioned papers, the authors present the error detection capability of the 
methods (for instance, parity based architectures can detect all odd multiplicity errors). 
However, none of the papers correlatesthe error multiplicity, that appear at the output of 
round operations, with detected transient stuck-at faults affecting signals in logic blocks 
during execution of these operations.  
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of the solutions described in Section 4 with 
respect to fault detection. We focused this study on the S-box only, for the following 
reasons:  
 it implements a 8 input bits function so it is possible to perform an exhaustive study; 
 most of the attacks are performed on this block; 
 Shiftrow module is anyway out of concern since it resumes to wiring; 
 AddRoundKey resumes to a single layer of XOR gates. Thus, under the selected fault 
model, only error of multiplicity 1 may occur when a fault affects a XOR gate signal; 
 MixCloumns operates on 32 input bits so an exhaustive study cannot be performed.  
Moreover, since the error propagation on the output of the SubBytes operation strongly 
depends on the implementation (netlist) of the S-box, we implemented different versions of 
the S-box using different synthesis parameters and implementation styles. In particular, we 
implemented the following designs using the AMS 0.35µm technology library: 
 Sbox1: description in VHDL as combinational look-up table, synthesis with Cadence©, 
553 cells 
 Sbox2: description in VHDL as combinational look-up table, synthesis with Design 
Compiler (Synopsys©) with “-map_effort high” option, 477 cells 
 Sbox3: description in VHDL as combinational look-up table, synthesis with Design 
Compiler with “-map_effort medium” option, 482 cells 
 Sbox4: description in VHDL as combinational look-up table, synthesis with Design 
Compiler with “-map_effort low” option, 474 cells  
 Sbox5: mathematical description in VHDL of two blocks: the inversion in GF(28) 
described as combinational look-up table plus the affine transformation, synthesis with 
Design Compiler with “-map_effort high” option, 481 cells 
 Sbox6: mathematical description in VHDL, by using the decomposition of calculations in 
GF(24) as described in (Wolkerstorferm et al., 2002), synthesis with Design Compiler 
with “-map_effort high” option, 193 cells 
For each S-box implementation we performed exhaustive fault simulation, i.e. we applied all 
the possible input values (256 values) and we fault simulated the behavior of the device for 
each possible stuck-at in the circuit. The fault simulation produced a fault dictionary 
composed by all the possible couples C formed by { input value / fault } and, associated to 
each of them, the number of erroneous bits at the output of the S-box. 
Table 4 reports the number of couples C leading to error multiplicities ranging from 0 to 8 
for each S-box implementation. The first column (error multiplicity = 0) represents all the 
cases where the fault is not excited by a specific input value, or its effect is not propagated to 
the output. For all the other cases, the cell reports, besides the number of couples C, the 
percentage with respect to the overall number of couples and, in bold, the percentage with 
respect to the number of couples that lead to at least 1 error at the output of the S-box. 
It is possible to note that, for instance, among the 11% of fault simulations for which a fault 
injection results in erroneous data on the Sbox1 output (89% of experiments result in 0 
error), about 78% of the cases result in only one erroneous output bit, justifying therefore the 
use of code-based solution that exploits simple parity bit. Likewise, the 14 couple 
[fault/vector] providing 8 output errors correspond to faults at the input of the Sbox. It 
might not be necessary to protect the Sbox with detection schemes able to detect 8 error bits, 
if these errors are detected at the input of the Sbox. 
Obviously, different S-box implementations lead the series of fault injection to different 
profiles in terms of error multiplicity. The presented implementations differ in terms of 
power consumption, performance and area according to chosen synthesis parameters. But 
the synthesis tool generates also quite different implementations whether the initial 
VHDL model is described as a look-up table or a mathematical expression.When starting 
from look-up table, the number of errors at the output of the S-box is concentrated around 1 
or 2 erroneous bits. On the contrary, mathematical-based architectures (Sbox5 and Sbox6) 
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attack itself. For each error multiplicity, 1000 randomly-chosen injection positions have been 
selected among randomly-chosen State array bits after execution of a randomly-chosen 
encryption operation. Simulation results are reported in Table 3. 
All the techniques detect errors with multiplicity larger than 6 bits, except the detection 
scheme in (Wu et al., 2004) that provides only one parity bit for the whole State array. 
Error  
multiplicity 
Number and percentage of the undetected errors 
 (Di Natale et al., 
2007 B) 
(16 parity bits + S-
box protection) 
(Yen and Wu, 2006)  
(4 CRC bytes) 
 (Bertoni et al., 2003) 
(16 parity bits) 
 (Wu et al., 2004) 
(1 parity bit) 
1 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 975 (2.44%) 
2 1883 (4.71%) 549 (1.37%) 2164 (5.41%) 5992 (14.98%) 
3 0 (0.00%) 2 (0.01%) 0 (0.00%) 1037 (2.59%) 
4 262 (0.66%) 70 (0.18%) 320 (0.80%) 6069 (15.17%) 
5 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 981 (2.45%) 
6 61 (0.15%) 0 (0.00%) 80 (0.20%) 6050 (15.13%) 
7 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 995 (2.49%) 
8 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5956 (14.89%) 
9 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1022 (2.56%) 
10 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5933 (14.83%) 
11 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 991 (2.48%) 
12 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6021 (15.05%) 
13 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1001 (2.50%) 
14 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6021 (15.05%) 
15 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1018 (2.55%) 
16 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 5997 (14.99%) 
….   
63 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1019 (2.55%) 
64 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6008 (15.02%) 
Table 3. Detection capability for random errors in 1 to 64 bits of a State  
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Moreover, since the error propagation on the output of the SubBytes operation strongly 
depends on the implementation (netlist) of the S-box, we implemented different versions of 
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 Sbox5: mathematical description in VHDL of two blocks: the inversion in GF(28) 
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 Sbox6: mathematical description in VHDL, by using the decomposition of calculations in 
GF(24) as described in (Wolkerstorferm et al., 2002), synthesis with Design Compiler 
with “-map_effort high” option, 193 cells 
For each S-box implementation we performed exhaustive fault simulation, i.e. we applied all 
the possible input values (256 values) and we fault simulated the behavior of the device for 
each possible stuck-at in the circuit. The fault simulation produced a fault dictionary 
composed by all the possible couples C formed by { input value / fault } and, associated to 
each of them, the number of erroneous bits at the output of the S-box. 
Table 4 reports the number of couples C leading to error multiplicities ranging from 0 to 8 
for each S-box implementation. The first column (error multiplicity = 0) represents all the 
cases where the fault is not excited by a specific input value, or its effect is not propagated to 
the output. For all the other cases, the cell reports, besides the number of couples C, the 
percentage with respect to the overall number of couples and, in bold, the percentage with 
respect to the number of couples that lead to at least 1 error at the output of the S-box. 
It is possible to note that, for instance, among the 11% of fault simulations for which a fault 
injection results in erroneous data on the Sbox1 output (89% of experiments result in 0 
error), about 78% of the cases result in only one erroneous output bit, justifying therefore the 
use of code-based solution that exploits simple parity bit. Likewise, the 14 couple 
[fault/vector] providing 8 output errors correspond to faults at the input of the Sbox. It 
might not be necessary to protect the Sbox with detection schemes able to detect 8 error bits, 
if these errors are detected at the input of the Sbox. 
Obviously, different S-box implementations lead the series of fault injection to different 
profiles in terms of error multiplicity. The presented implementations differ in terms of 
power consumption, performance and area according to chosen synthesis parameters. But 
the synthesis tool generates also quite different implementations whether the initial 
VHDL model is described as a look-up table or a mathematical expression.When starting 
from look-up table, the number of errors at the output of the S-box is concentrated around 1 
or 2 erroneous bits. On the contrary, mathematical-based architectures (Sbox5 and Sbox6) 
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are composed of several blocks that operate in cascade, and an error in a particular element 
is spread over several output bits. Therefore this type of implementation is first more 
sensitive to faults (in the case of Sbox6, 37% of couples generates an error at the output, 
while only 11% for Sbox1), and second it generates a higher number of output errors (the 
highest average is between 4 and 5).   
Such experiments must be conducted for selecting appropriate fault detection schemes. 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sbox1 450382 
90% 
36551 
7% / 78% 
6448 
1% / 14% 
2033 
0% / 4% 
953 
0% / 2% 
474 
0% / 1% 
235 
0% / 1% 
62 
0% / 0% 
14 
0% / 0% 
Sbox2 441836 
89% 
23664 
5% / 43% 
16744 
3% / 30% 
8547 
2% / 15% 
3922 
1% / 7% 
1631 
0% / 3% 
637 
0% / 1% 
147 
0% / 0% 
24 
0% / 0% 
Sbox3 438510 
89% 
23849 
5% / 44% 
16609 
4% / 30% 
8212 
2% / 15% 
3801 
1% / 7% 
1544 
0% / 3% 
619 
0% / 1% 
145 
0% / 0% 
23 
0% / 0% 
Sbox4 441855 
89% 
23658 
5% / 43% 
16745 
3% / 30% 
8534 
2% / 15% 
3924 
1% / 7% 
1629 
0% / 3% 
636 
0% / 1% 
147 
0% / 0% 
24 
0% / 0% 
Sbox5 418618 
86% 
7311 
2% / 11% 
8973 
2% / 13% 
4808 
1% / 7% 
9949 
2% / 15% 
27511 
6% / 41% 
8486 
2% / 13% 
212 
0% / 0% 
20 
0% / 0% 
Sbox6 144592 
63% 
9392 
4% / 11% 
8515 
4% / 10% 
10443 
5% / 12% 
24581 
11% / 29% 
21571 
9% / 26% 
4473 
2% / 5% 
3401 
1% / 4% 
2152 
1% / 3% 
Table 4. Fault vs error multiplicity on S-boxes output 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter presented a study on mechanisms involved for detecting faults-based attacks 
on crypto-processors. Using the example of a standard in symmetric cryptographic, fault-
based attacks were discussed with respect to their requirements in terms of error 
multiplicity (spatial and timing characteristics). We presented countermeasures to fault-
based attacks that consist in detecting errors on the ciphered information. We analyzed 
more precisely some error detection schemes based on code-redundancy, with respect to 
their cost and ability to detect errors occurring at run time. Analysis on error detection has 
been conducted according to the error multiplicity in order to check the ability of the 
protection schemes to detect exploitable errors. We also analyzed error detection schemes 
performances in terms of transient fault detection (natural or maliciously injected).  
Current attacks using laser-based fault injection require errors localized on very few bytes, 
without need of large precision as for the attack launch instant.  Error detection schemes can 
be used for preventing these attacks or detecting natural transient faults. Dedicated parity 
and CRC -based solutions exploit typical features of the cipher for optimization of cost 
factors (area, latency) and improvement of their error detection capacity. The correlation 
between the transient faults affecting the combinational parts of the circuit and the errors 
produced on sub-function outputs strongly depends on the implementation of the cipher. 
Experiments show that for some particular implementations, most of the faults results in 
only one or two erroneous output bits, while there is no internal faults affecting all the 
output bits. Such analysis on ciphering operations can justify simple and non expensive 
code-redundancy solutions. 
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are composed of several blocks that operate in cascade, and an error in a particular element 
is spread over several output bits. Therefore this type of implementation is first more 
sensitive to faults (in the case of Sbox6, 37% of couples generates an error at the output, 
while only 11% for Sbox1), and second it generates a higher number of output errors (the 
highest average is between 4 and 5).   
Such experiments must be conducted for selecting appropriate fault detection schemes. 
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